01—Abstract
Summary
Summary of the 10-K filed February 28, 2003. Cited figures are marked; the original filing is the authoritative source.
Tyler Technologies, Inc. (NYSE: TYL), a Dallas-based provider of integrated information management solutions and services for local governments, reported revenues of $133.9 milliona for fiscal 2002, up from $118.8 million in 2001.
Gross profit rose to $48.0 millionb from $40.0 million, and operating income increased to $10.7 million from $2.3 million. Net income was $8.0 million, or $0.16 per diluted share, compared with $269,000, or $0.01, in 2001. Net income included a $1.8 million gain from discontinued operations.
Cash flow from operating activities was $19.8 millionc, and cash and cash equivalents ended the year at $13.7 million. The company reported no bank borrowings outstanding under its $10.0 million revolving credit agreement at year-end. The company's backlog was $89.1 million at December 31, 2002, compared with $96.3 million a year earlier, with approximately $79.0 million expected to be installed or performed during 2003.
Revenue mix shifted notably in 2002: software licenses rose 25% to $24.3 milliond, partly aided by about $2.4 million from four customers for real estate appraisal software, while appraisal services grew 7% to $37.3 million. Maintenance revenue grew 11% to $40.7 million and the company described its annual maintenance run rate as in excess of $40 million. Management cited a technology recession and reduced public-sector and IT spending as risks to future demand.
A significant near-term item for investors is Tyler's 5.6 million-share stake in H.T.E., Inc. (about 35% ownership), carried at $27.2 million at year-end. Following a February 5, 2003 agreement by SunGard Data Systems to acquire H.T.E. for $7.00 per share in cash, Tyler stated it expects gross proceeds of approximately $39.3 million if the deal closes, which it expected in the first quarter of 2003. The filing also described the resolution of the Swan Transportation Company bankruptcy, under which Tyler agreed to contribute $1.5 million in cash to a claims trust.
02—Key points
Key Highlights
- Total revenues rose to $133.9 million in 2002 from $118.8 million in 2001, and operating income increased to $10.7 million from $2.3 million.
- Net income was $8.0 million, or $0.16 per diluted share, versus $269,000, or $0.01, in 2001; the result included a $1.8 million gain from discontinued operations.
- Gross margin was 36% in 2002 compared with 34% in 2001, benefiting from a richer mix of software license and maintenance revenue.
- Backlog stood at $89.1 million at December 31, 2002, down from $96.3 million a year earlier, with about $79.0 million expected to be performed in 2003.
- Tyler's stake in H.T.E., Inc. (carried at $27.2 million) is expected to yield about $39.3 million in gross cash proceeds if SunGard's $7.00-per-share acquisition of H.T.E. closes.
- Cash rose to $13.7 million at year-end, operating cash flow was $19.8 million, and there were no bank borrowings outstanding under the $10.0 million revolving credit agreement.
- Management noted that the company does not expect to pay cash dividends in the foreseeable future and repurchased 1.5 million shares in 2002 for $4.0 million.
03—Questions
Frequently Asked Questions
What drove the increase in 2002 revenue?
Software license revenue rose 25% to $24.3 million, including about $2.4 million from four customers for real estate appraisal software, and expansion of financial and city solutions products into the Midwest and West. Maintenance revenue increased 11% to $40.7 million, driven by a growing installed customer base and slightly higher rates. Appraisal services revenue rose 7% to $37.3 million, mainly due to the Lake County, Indiana contract.
What is the status of the H.T.E. investment?
Tyler holds about 5.6 million shares of H.T.E. common stock, representing about 35% ownership, carried at $27.2 million at December 31, 2002. On February 4, 2003, Tyler agreed to tender its shares in a tender offer by SunGard Data Systems, which had agreed to acquire H.T.E. for $7.00 per share in cash. Tyler expects gross proceeds of about $39.3 million if the transaction is consummated, and the filing states there can be no assurance it will close on the disclosed terms. The acquisition was expected to close in the first quarter of 2003.
What is the Swan Transportation Company matter and what does Tyler owe?
Swan Transportation Company, a non-operating subsidiary, filed for Chapter 11 in December 2001 over claims from former foundry employees alleging exposure to silica, asbestos and related dusts. The confirmed plan creates a trust funded principally by fifteen insurance carriers. Tyler agreed to transfer Swan's capital stock to the trust and contribute $1.5 million in cash, payable $750,000 within ten days of the order becoming final, $500,000 on the first anniversary and $250,000 on the second anniversary. The filing notes the settlement was about $200,000 less than the previously recorded liability.
How strong is the company's balance sheet and liquidity?
At December 31, 2002, Tyler had cash of $13.7 million, up from $5.3 million a year earlier, and shareholders' equity of $118.7 million. Long-term obligations were $3.0 million including current portion, and the debt-to-capital ratio was 2%. The company had no outstanding bank borrowings under its $10.0 million revolving credit agreement, with an available borrowing base of $6.3 million after $3.7 million of letters of credit. Management stated that existing cash, operating cash flows and available borrowing capacity should be sufficient for at least the next year absent acquisitions.
What risks did management highlight for future results?
Management cited a decline in information technology spending by state and local governments, quarterly revenue fluctuations with a historical concentration of revenue in the second half of the year, and the unpredictable timing of public-sector contract awards and open bidding. It also noted risks from fixed-price contracts, competition from larger firms and in-house departments, the adoption of an ASP model that remains unproven, and the difficulty of obtaining performance bonds. The company also flagged higher insurance and compliance costs tied to Sarbanes-Oxley.
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